Cloud Security

"In 2024, new and unattributed cloud intrusions increased 26% compared to 2023, indicating more threat actors seek to exploit cloud services. CrowdStrike observed more intrusions in which attackers gained initial access via valid accounts, leveraged cloud environment management tools for lateral movement, and abused cloud provider command line tools."

- Crowdstrike 2025 Global Threat Report

Cloud compromises rarely come from a single critical misconfiguration. They come from chains: a leaked credential, an over-permissive role, a metadata endpoint reachable from a workload, a storage bucket that trusts the wrong principal. Individually each is a medium finding. Together they are full control of your environment.

We test AWS, Azure, and GCP environments the way an attacker would use them. Starting from an assumed position, whether an exposed service, a compromised developer identity, or a foothold inside a workload, an operator maps the identity and network relationships, builds the tooling needed to abuse them, and follows the path as far as it goes.

The output is the demonstrated attack path, not a configuration benchmark: what was reachable, which permissions made it possible, and the specific changes that break the chain. Hardening advice that falls out of the work is noted separately so it never dilutes what actually needs fixing.